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The Evolutionary Biology 
of Decision Making 
Jeffrey R. Stevens 
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck 
Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany 
Abstract 
Evolutionary and psychological approaches to decision making remain largely separate 
endeavors. Each offers necessary techniques and perspectives which, when integrated, 
will aid the study of decision making in both humans and nonhuman animals. The 
evolutionary focus on selection pressures highlights the goals of decisions and the con-
ditions under which different selection processes likely influence decision making. An 
evolutionary view also suggests that fully rational decision processes do not likely exist 
in nature. The psychological view proposes that cognition is hierarchically built on low-
er-level processes. Evolutionary approaches to decision making have not considered 
the cognitive building blocks necessary to implement decision strategies, thereby mak-
ing most evolutionary models of behavior psychologically implausible. The synthesis 
of evolutionary and psychological constraints will generate more plausible models of 
decision making. 
Introduction 
A hungry female chimpanzee spies a termite mound and quickly fashions a 
branch into a long twig. She then uncovers a tunnel in the mound and inserts 
her twig. Soon, she extracts the twig, revealing a dozen wriggling termites 
clinging on tightly. The expert angler carefully plucks off and consumes each 
insect. As she repeats the process, she depletes the soldier termites arriving 
to defend their nest. When should she leave this hole to either excavate an-
other tunnel or seek a new mound altogether? What cognitive process does she 
use to make this decision? What cognitive building blocks does she need to 
implement this process? Of the various processes possible, why does she use 
this one? This foraging situation raises these and numerous other questions for 
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biologists and psychologists interested in decision making in both humans and 
nonhuman animals. 
Tinbergen (1963) posited four levels of analysis for why a behavior exists: 
the phylogenetic, functional, developmental, and mechanistic levels. Evolu-
tionary biologists focus primarily on why behavioral decisions exist from a 
functional perspective. For example, what benefit exists for leaving the ter-
mite hole now versus in ten minutes? Psychologists, by contrast, explore the 
mechanistic level, concentrating typically on cognitive mechanisms involved 
in decision making. For instance, what information does the chimpanzee use 
to decide when to leave, and how does she acquire this information? Regretta-
bly, the functional and mechanistic studies of decision making have remained 
largely separate endeavors, with many behavioral biologists and psychologists 
reluctant to cross disciplinary boundaries. Yet, the emergence of cognitive 
ecology and evolutionary psychology as fields demonstrates a recent push to 
integrate behavioral function and mechanism across species (see, e.g., Barkow 
et al. 1992; Dukas 1998; Hammerstein and Hagen 2005; Kacelnik 2006). This 
integration should be taken seriously when models of cognitive mechanisms 
and evolutionary outcomes are constructed. Here, I propose ways in which an 
evolutionary analysis can aid psychologists and ways in which a psychologi-
cal analysis can aid evolutionary biologists in studying human and nonhuman 
animal decision making. 
Evolutionary theory offers well-developed models of how a process of se-
lection influences a characteristic or trait over time. I begin by briefly reviewing 
an evolutionary approach of decision making. Then I explore different selec-
tion processes and how they can influence a decision mechanism. Consider-
ing the kinds of pressures acting on decisions can help evaluate the feasibility 
of their mechanisms. Psychologists often characterize the cognitive building 
blocks or psychological capacities (such as memory capacities, learning struc-
tures, and attentional abilities) required for higher-level behavior. Cognitive 
building blocks are often absent from evolutionary models of behavior, leaving 
the models unconstrained and incomplete. Combining selective pressures and 
cognitive building blocks will lead to more plausible evolutionary and psycho-
logical models of decision making. 
Natural Selection and Decision Making 
Natural selection is a process by which biological evolution occurs; it results 
when heritable variation in a trait has differential influences on fitness. We can 
define fitness as the expected number of descendents produced by an individ-
ual, usually measured as survival and reproduction. Individuals that produce 
more descendents in future generations have higher fitness. A heritable behav-
ior that gives even a slight advantage in survival to one individual relative to 
others will propagate over evolutionary time, resulting in more genes for that 
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advantageous behavior in the population. Thus, natural selection favors traits 
resulting in higher survival and reproduction. With a constant environment and 
enough genetic variation and time, this type of process results in organisms 
reaching fitness optima. Many biologists tend to focus on this end state and 
thereby consider natural selection an optimizing process. Inevitably, a process 
that favors an increase in fitness results in reaching an optimum, but natural 
selection as a process does not optimize globally to adapt organisms perfectly 
to their environments. Instead, natural selection "optimizes under constraints," 
and a number of factors can constrain the evolution of behavior. First, the fit-
ness payoffs of a behavior must trade off both the benefits and the costs. For 
instance, a foraging rule that extends the time an animal stays in a patch of 
food might increase an individual's overall food intake, resulting in a fitness 
advantage over an individual with a shorter patch exploitation time. This rule, 
however, has consequences outside of the foraging domain that may balance 
(or exceed) the benefits of longer foraging times. For instance, foraging in a 
patch for longer time intervals may increase exposure to predators, potentially 
offsetting the benefits of higher food intake. Natural selection optimizes to-
tal net fitness across all domains of an organism's survival and reproduction, 
thereby constraining optimization in any single domain. Second, natural selec-
tion does not act as a designer, creating traits de novo. Rather, it acts as a tin-
kerer, building on previous traits and accumulating change. The evolutionary 
history of an organism sets the starting point and thereby constrains potential 
evolutionary trajectories (see McElreath et aI., this volume). Thus, natural se-
lection optimizes behavior given trade-offs with other behaviors and existing 
evolutionary building blocks. 
Many behavioral biologists accept the assumption of natural selection as 
an optimizing (under constraints) process and use mathematical optimization 
techniques as a tool to predict end-state behavior given a set of environmental 
parameters. Numerous behavioral domains use optimization techniques, espe-
cially foraging theory (Stephens and Krebs 1986). The termite fishing example 
highlights one of the classic models of optimal foraging: the patch model. When 
in a patch of food, foragers receive a particular rate of gain; that is, a particular 
amount of food per unit time spent foraging. As the forager continues to con-
sume food, the patch may deplete, thereby diminishing the returns to staying in 
the patch. Thus, foragers must decide when to leave and travel to a new patch 
versus stay and continue to deplete the current patch. Optimization theory pre-
dicts that in some circumstances foragers should leave a patch when the intake 
rate at that patch drops below the average intake rate at the remaining patches 
(Charnov 1976). This optimal policy suggests that longer travel times between 
patches should result in longer patch residence times. Experimental and field 
data qualitatively support predictions derived from the optimal policy, but the 
data do not necessarily provide a good quantitative fit. Including more realistic 
assumptions about the role of physiological state, predation risk, and alterna-
tive activities provides a better account of the data (Nonacs 2001). 
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Assuming that organisms make optimal decisions, what cognitive process 
do they use? Optimality theorists readily admit the infeasibility of animals us-
ing optimal decision processes to arrive at optimal outcomes: animals do not 
calculate a range of expected fitness consequences and apply calculus to find 
the optimum. Instead, optimality theorists suggest that natural selection acts as 
the optimizing selection process, generating decision processes that result in 
approximately optimal outcomes (Stephens and Krebs 1986; Smith and Win-
terhalder 1992; Houston and McNamara 1999). Therefore, animals that use 
decision processes or strategies approaching the optimum outcome transfer 
more genes to future generations. This focus on strategies is important because 
natural selection selects for decision processes not the behavior per se, since 
only the decision process is heritable. 
An evolutionary perspective emphasizes three important components of a 
decision: the decision processes, outcomes, and selection processes. To un-
derstand how natural selection can act on decisions, we must first map out the 
components of the decision mechanism. 
The Anatomy of a Decision 
Decisions-broadly defined here as the results of an evaluation of possible 
options-can take a variety of forms, including both inferences and prefer-
ences. Inferences go beyond the information given to make predictions about 
the state of the world; for instance, knowing the color ofa fruit, can a decision 
maker infer its ripeness and sugar content? In contrast, preferences rank the 
desirability of options; for instance, would a decision maker prefer to receive 
a small food item now or a large food item tomorrow? This distinction has not 
been widely acknowledged (cf. Gigerenzer and Todd 1999), yet it could have 
important implications for the evolution of decision making. 
Figure l3.l illustrates the primary components of a decision mechanism. 
This description of a decision is silent on whether each component acts at a 
conscious or subconscious level, and most of the components can act at either 
level. Many decisions begin with a goal or task, such as foraging for food. The 
decision mechanism then gathers and processes information to reach a deci-
sion, which may result in an action and a payoff outcome. 
Information 
A decision maker must first search for information about possible decision 
options, although some information may be readily available for processing. 
The search for information can occur at an internal or external level (Fiedler 
and Juslin 2006). Internal search often refers to searching through memory 
for relevant information about options, whereas external search refers to per-
ceiving information in the physical and social environment. In our foraging 
example, the chimpanzee may retrieve internally from memory information on 
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Figure 13.1 The decision mechanism and selection processes. The decision mecha-
nism begins when information from either the internal or external environment feeds 
into the decision process. The decision process then generates a decision, which pos-
sibly leads to an action and outcome. Selection pressures such as natural selection, 
reinforcement learning, and functional evaluation can alter the decision mechanism by 
providing feedback about the realized or possible outcomes. Note that reinforcement 
learning can either influence action directly (learning a behavior) or can influence the 
decision process (learning a strategy). 
the intake rates at other termite mounds and may track externally the gain and 
foraging time at the current mound when deciding when to leave. 
Decision Process 
In the decision process, a mechanism processes and integrates information 
to make a decision. Although other perspectives exist, I focus here on two 
general views of the decision-making process: unbounded rationality and 
bounded rationality. 
Historically, many models of decision making have been based on the "eco-
nomic man" perspective, in which decision makers can access all information 
relevant to a decision and arrive at optimal inferences via rules of logic and 
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statistics (e.g., Bayes's rule, linear regression) or exhibit optimal preferences 
via rules of probability (e.g., expected utilities). An unboundedly rational deci-
sion maker uses all information available to arrive at the decision producing 
an optimal outcome. Proponents of unbounded rationality focus on the optimal 
outcomes and skirt claims about optimal processes by stating that agents be-
have "as if' they are rational. Nevertheless, any claims of unbounded rational-
ity require that agents possess sophisticated mental inference or preference 
functions that, when supplied with all relevant information, output the opti-
mal decision. Deviations from the norms of linear regression, Bayes's rule, or 
expected utility are considered normatively "irrational" (but not necessarily 
unsophisticated) behavior. 
An alternative to the omniscience and unlimited computational power re-
quired of economic man is a perspective emphasizing a more realistic view 
of tools available to decision makers. The bounded rationality approach ad-
vocates a plausible notion of the capacities of and constraints on the mind, 
as well as the interaction of the mind and the decision-making environment 
(Simon 1956; Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). This bounded rationality approach 
implies a set of computationally simple heuristics that use only partial infor-
mation to make good, robust decisions that apply to specific decision-making 
environments (Payne et al. 1993; Gigerenzer et al. 1999). Rather than having 
general-purpose statistical devices requiring extensive information and com-
plicated computations, decision makers often succeed by using simple heuris-
tics adapted specifically to their environment. The simple heuristics approach 
makes explicit predictions about the decision process, the outcomes, and the 
conditions under which heuristics will work. 
Decisions, Actions, and Outcomes 
The decision process, of course, results in a decision: either an inference or a 
preference. Though I distinguish between inferences and preferences as sepa-
rate entities, they can interact such that inferences can feed into preference 
decisions and vice versa. However, as internal constructs, inference and prefer-
ence decisions are invisible to selection pressures such as natural selection and 
reinforcement learning. A decision maker must translate a decision into action 
(even if the action is not to act) to experience exterual consequences (Rachlin 
1989). A decision process that generates a decision not connected to an action 
cannot be selected for via natural selection or learning. 
In summary, the decision mechanism inputs information from the internal 
and external environment into a decision process, which generates a decision. 
The decision maker chooses an action based on this decision and receives an 
outcome. Stopping here, however, raises the question: How do we know wheth-
er a decision is good or bad? An evolutionary analysis provides an answer. 
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Selection Criteria and Processes 
To determine whether a decision is good or bad, a selection process must 
evaluate the outcome relative to some criterion. Hammond (2000, 2007) de-
scribed two types of selection criteria: correspondence and coherence. Corre-
spondence refers to the degree to which decisions achieve empirical accuracy; 
that is, whether they reflect the true state of the world. For instance, we can 
evaluate an inference about how fruit color relates to sugar content based on 
how well this inference corresponds with the true relationship between color 
and sugar content. Alternatively, coherence refers to following norms, usually 
rational norms such as Bayesian reasoning and expected utility theory. An in-
ference about fruit color and sugar content cannot only correspond to the state 
of the world; it can also cohere to a Bayesian analysis of an individual's prior 
experience with color and sugar content. 
Inferences and preferences differ in which types of criteria apply to them. 
Both criteria can apply to inferences: how accurately they correspond to the 
state of the world and how consistently they cohere to a norm (as demonstrated 
by the fruit color/sugar example). Preferences, however, have no correspon-
dence criteria, since they simply reflect an internal ranking and therefore rely 
only on coherence criteria. When deciding between a smaller, sooner versus 
larger, later reward, for example, there is no "correct" choice based on the 
state of the world. Rather, the choice depends on the relevant norm: Are you 
maximizing expected utility or minimizing the time to your next reward? The 
lack of a universal criterion makes matching a decision to a coherence criterion 
quite difficult. Most studies of inference assess whether performance coheres 
to predictions of logical analysis. For example, in the Wason selection task 
(Figure 13.2; see also Schooler, this volume), most subjects violate logical 
analysis of the situation. However, the pattern of data fits the assumption that 
decision makers are maximizing information gain rather than following logic 
(Oaksford and Chater 1994). Additionally, when the situation is framed as a 
social contract rather than an abstract logic problem, subjects provide the logi-
cally correct solution much more often, possibly triggering an evolved cheater 
detection mechanism (Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Gigerenzer and Hug 1992). 
Given that multiple coherence criteria exist and different criteria seem to gov-
ern behavior in different contexts, it may prove difficult to predict a priori 
which coherence criterion is relevant to a particular decision. 
Selection processes evaluate how well outcomes match the selective cri-
teria, and different selection processes require different criteria. As one class 
of processes, Skinner (1981) proposed selection by consequences-processes 
which select or reject behaviors based on their realized outcomes. The selec-
tion-by-consequences view emphasizes that the process of selection works on 
previous consequences. In decision making, two selection processes clearly 
use selection by consequences (natural selection and reinforcement learning), 
whereas a third (functional evaluation) does not. This is not an exhaustive list 
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Figure 13.2 Wason selection task. Subjects must decide which of four cards to tum 
over to test the rule: if there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on 
the other. This is logically equivalent to the rule ijp, then q. Most subjects choose A or 
A and 2. The logically correct solution is A and 7; that is, following the rules of logic, 
subjects should investigate p and not-q. 
of selection processes for human or other animals, but it offers a starting point 
for exploring feedback mechanisms that shape decisions. 
Natural Selection 
Natural selection provides the ultimate example of selection by consequences. 
When an individual with specific inferences and preferences produces more 
offspring than other individuals, the genes influencing those inferences and 
preferences will proliferate in the population. Specifically, natural selection 
favors genes for decision processes that result in good decisions, actions, and 
outcomes from a fitness perspective. Note that with natural selection no direct 
pressure exists for accuracy or correspondence per se, just pressure to produce 
descendents. Accuracy is only valuable when tied to fitness. For instance, it 
makes no sense evolutionarily for a strict carnivore to make inferences about 
fruit color and sugar content, because it faces no fitness consequences for mak-
ing the inference. Similarly, selection cannot act at the decision stage alone 
because without behavior, no differential fitness exists. Inferences and prefer-
ences without action have no consequences upon which selection can act. Even 
if an action is taken, selection does not act on the action itself because multiple 
decision processes can yield the same action. Natural selection can only act on 
heritable decision processes that generate actions and produce outcomes. 
The slow pace at which natural selection can track a changing environment 
means that genetically coding all decision mechanisms would leave organ-
isms poorly adapted to their environment. Dawkins (1976) pointed out that our 
brains are not slaves to our genes; they allow us to process information and 
execute actions flexibly. Dawkins compared our genes to policy makers and 
our brains to executives. Stanovich (2004) described decisions under direct 
influence of genes as "short-leashed" and more flexible behavior controlled 
by brains rather than genes as "long-leashed." Natural selection has equipped 
decision makers with longer-leashed decision mechanisms by creating other 
selection processes that respond more flexibly to the environment: reinforce-
ment learning and functional evaluation. 
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Reinforcement Learning 
Learning, of course, does not require evolutionary time or the differential 
survival of individuals. Instead, over the lifetime of an individual (or poten-
tially much shorter time periods), actions yielding good outcomes occur more 
often than actions yielding poor outcomes (Skinner 1938). Therefore, learn-
ing selects based on the coherence criteria of reinforcer maximization. Why 
then is one outcome more reinforcing than another? Because natural selec-
tion built learning mechanisms to allow flexible decision making, the value 
of reinforcement is tied directly to evolutionarily relevant commodities. More 
food, water, and sex, along with less pain, typically result in higher fitness, 
though not always. A mechanism exploiting this correlation will tend to serve 
the organism well; substituting reinforcer maximization as a proxy for fitness 
maximization allows a more flexible proximate mechanism to achieve a good 
evolutionary result. 
Some types of learning differ from natural selection in the decision compo-
nents used. For instance, in operant conditioning, a response is associated with 
a reinforcer; this maps onto the action and outcome components of Figure 13.1. 
Therefore, operant conditioning does not influence the decision process itself 
but simply the frequency of an action given its outcome. In contrast, Rieskamp 
and Otto (2006) suggested that reinforcement learning can also work at the lev-
el of the decision process or strategy. Decision makers can learn to implement 
different decision processes based on feedback from the outcomes received. 
Reinforcement learning can then adapt either actions or the decision process 
itself to the reinforcement contingencies in the environment. 
Functional Evaluation 
Natural selection favors appropriate decision processes over evolutionary time, 
and reinforcement learning selects behavior over the lifetime. Both processes 
select actions based on previously experienced outcomes. Perhaps natural se-
lection has allowed even more flexibility in decision making by further length-
ening the leash. Novel decision-making environments may arise, making hard-
wired rules obsolete and trial-and-error learning too costly or slow. Perhaps 
natural selection has generated a selection process that selects not on previous 
outcomes but on behavior to achieve a desired end state or goal. Using this 
selection process-here termed functional evaluation-a decision maker men-
tally evaluates the decision options available and chooses the one with the 
potential to maximize the relevant selection criterion. Instead of maximizing 
fitness or reinforcer value, functional evaluation assesses potential actions and 
outcomes relative to a decision goal. 
Because functional evaluation considers the fit between outcomes and the 
selective criteria directly, selection is embedded completely within the deci-
sion process phase of the decision mechanism. Unlike natural selection and 
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learning, functional evaluation selection occurs before making an action. 
Actions do not die out and are not reinforced, but can be entertained mentally 
and compared to the decision goal. Functional evaluation requires an internal 
representation ofthe coherence criteria, such as a mental utility function. Also, 
unlike natural selection and learning, there exists no single selective criterion 
for functional evaluation. Individuals can maximize utility, predictive accura-
cy, sampling opportunities, or many other criteria. There is no single criterion 
because decision makers face multiple decision goals simultaneously. 
Functional evaluation should not be confused with a decision process. It 
does not refer to the conscious processing of information. In fact, functional 
evaluation can occur at either the conscious or subconscious level. It simply 
refers to the selection process in which outcomes are evaluated before they 
are experienced. 
Optimal Processes and Outcomes 
The "anatomical" classification of decision making emphasizes two processes 
at work: the selection process and the decision process. Recall that the selection 
process evaluates the outcomes with the correspondence or coherence criteria, 
whereas the decision process gathers and processes information to arrive at a 
decision. In natural selection, the selection process works directly on the deci-
sion process, which then generates the decision outcome. This hierarchy helps 
assess which (if any) aspects of decision making are optimal. I contend that 
an optimal selection process is required to create an optimal decision process, 
which is required to produce universally optimal outcomes. I define optimal 
outcomes as the best possible payoffs, optimal decision processes as processes 
that always produce optimal outcomes, and optimal selection processes as pro-
cesses that always produce optimal decision processes. 
As previously stated, natural selection is not an unboundedly optimal selec-
tion process, rather it optimizes under constraints. Because natural selection 
optimizes under constraints, it cannot produce universally optimal decision 
processes and therefore cannot yield optimal outcomes across all decision-
making domains. It can nevertheless result in optimal outcomes for specific 
circumstances. To take an example from foraging, natural selection will not 
generate a mechanism that obtains all information about all possible foraging 
opportunities, trades the lost opportunity for other fitness-enhancing endeavors, 
and then calculates the optimal foraging choice. This would represent a uni-
versally optimal decision process that always yields the best fitness outcomes. 
Yet, a mechanism may evolve that can sample from two foraging patches and 
choose the one that yields the highest intake rate, resulting in an optimal out-
come. The difference lies in the scale: optimality can evolve at small scales for 
particular circumstances but not at large scales across all domains. As Houston 
et al. (2007, p. 1532) explain: "We cannot expect natural selection, having no 
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foresight, to shape organisms to act rationally in all circumstances, but only in 
those circumstances which it encounters in its natural setting." 
The limitations of natural selection's optimization under constraints not 
only influence the decision process and outcomes, but also trickle down into 
the other selection processes. Because both reinforcement learning and func-
tional evaluation selection mechanisms result from evolution by natural se-
lection, they cannot be unboundedly optimal selection processes; no evolved 
selection or decision process can be unboundedly optimal. A selection process 
would have to emerge outside of natural selection to be truly optimal. 
In summary, the selection process view makes two contributions to the 
study of decision making. First, it requires an analysis of the pressures that 
shape decision making. Natural selection, reinforcement learning, and func-
tional evaluation influence the decision mechanism. Natural selection and re-
inforcement learning select decision processes or actions based on previous 
realized consequences, whereas functional evaluation selects decisions in the 
absence of direct feedback from an outcome. 
Second, the selection perspective suggests that the constrained optimization 
of natural selection will limit the degree of optimality for evolved selection 
processes and decision processes. It seems implausible for a constrained opti-
mization selection process to generate a universally optimal decision process 
following a rational norm. Instead, natural selection likely creates decision 
processes that increase fitness rather than cohere to the rules of logic and prob-
ability theory (Hammond 2007). Therefore, the frequent labeling of behaviors 
as "irrational," "anomalies," or "biases" assumes a particular perspective of 
rational norms. A broader, evolutionary perspective, however, cautions against 
using these labels, emphasizing instead an understanding of the decision goals, 
selection pressures, and decision-making environment. 
The Evolution of the Decision Process 
Given that natural selection cannot generate universally optimal decisions, 
what kinds of decision processes are feasible? As mentioned previously, many 
studies of decision making assume, at least implicitly, unbounded rationality 
and thereby imply an implausibly omniscient, temporally unconstrained, and 
computationally unlimited decision maker. There are, however, examples in 
which agents seem to make unboundedly rational decisions (Glimcher 2003; 
GlOckner, this volume). These decisions, however, occur in specific circum-
stances, and the generality of their application remains unexplored. Moreover, 
even if organisms possess the ability to use higher-order cognitive skills like 
optimal decision making, they do not necessarily do so when simpler abilities 
will suffice. For instance, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) use simpler, 
amount-based mechanisms when discriminating different quantities of food, 
even though they can use more sophisticated, number-based mechanisms in 
other situations (Stevens et al. 2007). 
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A more computationally and evolutionarily plausible perspective is the 
bounded rationality approach, which assumes that decision makers use simple 
heuristics and satisficing rules to make decisions with minimal information 
over short time periods (reviewed in Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005). Al-
though many behavioral biologists ignore the process of decision making, they 
work under the assumption that animals do not use optimal decision processes. 
Instead, biologists often assume that animals use rules of thumb (heuristics) 
that approach optimal outcomes. 
Evolving Simple Heuristics 
The simple heuristics approach emphasizes the presence of rules for ordering 
information search, stopping search, and making a decision (Gigerenzer et al. 
1999). These heuristics require little computation and use minimal information 
to make decisions. The rules of thumb approach in biology has coincidentally 
focused on the fast and frugal nature of rules of thumb without explicitly con-
sidering the search, stop, and decision rules of the heuristics. 
Animals use rules of thumb in a number of important decision-making con-
texts, ranging from navigation to nest construction (Marsh 2002; Hutchinson 
and Gigerenzer 2005). Rules of thumb are particularly well studied in optimal 
foraging (Stephens and Krebs 1986), which may seem like a rather unlikely 
area for their application given the intense focus on optimization models. Bi-
ologists, however, distinguish between optimal outcomes and feasible mecha-
nisms that can approach those outcomes. 
Biologists have investigated the use of simple rules in the patch choice 
model of foraging described in the termite fishing example. Recall that in this 
scenario, foraging chimpanzees must decide when to leave a patch and move 
on to another. The optimal policy recommends leaving when the intake rate 
at the current patch equals the average intake rate for the remaining patches 
under this policy. Calculating or estimating this average intake rate in the en-
vironment (including travel times) is not computationally trivial. A number 
of researchers have proposed simple patch-leaving rules that avoid some of 
the complicated computations (reviewed in Stephens and Krebs 1986). For 
instance, rather than comparing the current intake rate to the average rate, ani-
mals may just leave a patch when the current intake rate drops below a critical 
threshold. Other simpler rules even dispense with the requirement of directly 
monitoring the current intake rate and instead estimate this rate indirectly. Ani-
mals using these rules may leave after consuming a certain number of prey 
items (fixed number rule), after a certain time period after arriving at a patch 
(fixed time rule), or after a certain time period of unsuccessful foraging (giv-
ing-up time rule). Empirical evidence suggests that different animal species 
use these various rules in different foraging situations (Stephens and Krebs 
1986; van Alphen et al. 2003; Wajnberg et al. 2003). 
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The use of simple rules and heuristics by nonhuman animals is not ter-
ribly surprising. This perspective, however, has stimulated more controversy 
when applied to human decision making (see Todd and Gigerenzer 2000 and 
subsequent commentaries). Do humans use simple heuristics for important de-
cisions? Gigerenzer and colleagues have argued that in certain environments 
heuristics can achieve good outcomes. Given that the human brain has been 
built by evolution through natural selection, we can infer that the costs of deci-
sion computations weigh heavily in the evolution of decision processes and 
that processes with simple decision rules tend to prevail over complex compu-
tations when yielding similar outcomes. 
Evolving Satisficing Rules 
When using another mechanism of bounded rationality-satisficing-decision 
makers search through options and select the first one that surpasses some 
threshold or aspiration level (Simon 1956). Economists and psychologists fre-
quently investigate satisficing in decision making from the individual to the 
institutional level. Biologists, however, have not warmed to the concept of sat-
isficing. Skepticism in biology derives from at least two sources (Stephens and 
Krebs 1986; Smith and Winterhalder 1992). First, satisficing theory provides 
no a priori justifications for how thresholds are set: What is "good enough"? 
Second, if natural selection is an optimizing process, then satisficing is not 
evolutionarily stable. An individual who optimizes and consistently exceeds 
another individual's decision threshold (e.g., makes better than "good enough" 
decisions) will have higher fitness, and this optimizing trait will spread relative 
to the satisficing trait. Stephens and Krebs (1986) suggested that if the effect 
of performance on fitness is a step function, a satisficing rule could evolve, but 
they argue that this rigid function is uncommon in nature. Instead, it is likely 
that fitness increases continuously with performance. 
Despite skepticism towards satisficing, some biologists champion it as a 
reasonable decision process (Janetos and Cole 1981; Ward 1992), and recent 
theoretical investigations have modeled satisficing strategies in foraging and 
mate choice contexts (Todd and Miller 1999; Carmel and Ben-Haim 2005). In 
these cases, satisficing can produce nearly optimal outcomes with appropriate 
thresholds, depending on the costs of information acquisition and the level of 
environmental variation. Additionally, these satisficing mechanisms yield de-
cisions that are more robust to uncertainty (Todd and Gigerenzer 2000; Carmel 
and Ben-Haim 2005), yielding better than "good enough" results. 
Using limited information and simplified decision rules can produce optimal 
or near optimal outcomes, and thus heuristics and satisficing can offer plausible 
processes for decision making. These decision processes act independently of 
the selection process. Heuristics and satisficing can be genetically hardwired, 
subject directly to natural selection; they can be learned based on reinforcer 
value; or they can be functionally evaluated relative to a decision goal. 
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Evolving the Mechanisms for Decision Making 
An evolutionary perspective can clarify the role of selection pressures and 
limit the set of plausible decision processes. Thus far, however, the evolution-
ary perspective has largely ignored the cognitive building blocks needed to 
implement decisions. For instance, the rational-actor approach in game theory 
assumes that all individuals have perfect knowledge of all other individuals' 
knowledge and beliefs, meaning that I know that you know that I know that 
you know and on and on. This implies that game theoretic decision making 
requires the cognitive building block of theory of mind (McCabe and Smith 
2000; Hedden and Zhang 2002; McCabe and Singer, this volume), so decision 
makers can represent the knowledge and beliefs of other agents. The building 
block approach allows us to predict which types of decision makers utilize 
which types of decision processes: organisms lacking specific cognitive abili-
ties cannot implement certain decision processes. My colleagues and I have 
explored this idea in the realm of animal cooperative interactions (Stevens and 
Hauser 2004; Stevens, Cushman et al. 2005). 
A Case Study in Cooperation 
One of the most-studied games in biology is the Prisoner's Dilemma (Figure 
13.3), a game in which individuals can either cooperate or defect. Cooperation 
maximizes the total payoff to everyone involved in the interaction (mutual 
cooperation provides higher benefits than mutual defection); however, any in-
dividual receives higher personal payoffs by defecting, resulting in a sizable 
temptation to cheat. Unilateral cooperation is not evolutionarily stable in this 
game; therefore, cooperation is altruistic because cooperators pay a fitness cost 
by foregoing the temptation to cheat. The possibility of altruistic cooperation 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma intrigues biologists, because the presence of altru-
istic behavior violates the standard principles of natural selection. A defector 
will have a higher payoff than an altruist and therefore will contribute more 
genes to the next generation. Biologists have proposed a number of solutions 
to the Prisoner's Dilemma that may allow cooperation to exist, including kin 
selection, reciprocal altruism, punishment, and reputation formation (Dugatkin 
1997). Reciprocal altruism, in which individuals pay a short-term cost of co-
operation for the future benefit of a social partner's reciprocated cooperation 
(Trivers 1971), has probably gained the most attention. Axelrod and Hamil-
ton (1981) investigated an evolutionary strategy for reciprocal altruism called 
Tit-for-Tat (TFT), in which a player begins by cooperating and copies the 
opponent's previous behavior. TFT can outperform pure defection when indi-
viduals repeatedly engage in a Prisoner's Dilemma with the same partners (al-
though TFT is not evolutionarily stable; Selten and Hammerstein 1984; Boyd 
and Lorberbaum 1987). Therefore, a rule such as TFT can, in theory, maintain 
cooperation in the face of defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Yet, despite 
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Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate R S 
Defect T P 
Figure 13.3 Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, players 
must decide to cooperate or defect, and the payoffs are ranked such that T> R > P > s. 
Mutual cooperation pays more than mutual defection (R > P), but defection always pays 
more than cooperation for an individual (T> Rand P > S). 
theoretical evidence supporting the viability of reciprocal altruism, it is not 
well supported by empirical evidence in animals (Clements and Stephens 1995; 
Noe and Hammerstein 1995; Pusey and Packer 1997; Hammerstein 2003). 
Why is reciprocal altruism rare in animals when TFT is such a simple heu-
ristic? Perhaps, despite numerous theoretical investigations ofTFT, no models 
have included the cognitive building blocks required to implement reciprocal 
strategies (Hammerstein 2003; Stevens and Hauser 2004; Stevens, Cushman 
et al. 2005). When Trivers (1971) first introduced the concept of reciprocal 
altruism, he outlined necessary prerequisites, including one cognitive build-
ing block: the ability to detect cheaters (individual recognition). This single 
requirement does not likely capture the cognitive sophistication required for 
utilizing reciprocal strategies. In particular, the delay between the cost of a co-
operative act and the benefit of reciprocated cooperation introduces a number 
of cognitive challenges. Minimally, this delay interacts with memory, inhibi-
tory control, and impulsivity processes. 
Memory 
Limitations in memory decay, interference, and capacity can constrain the 
frequency of reciprocal altruism. Models of forgetting predict exponential 
or power functions (Wixted 2004) that decay rapidly over time. Therefore, 
longer time intervals between cooperative acts may make reciprocal altruism 
more difficult. Even with short time delays between cooperative interactions, 
previous memories can interfere with recall, and every potential new partner 
increases the computational load of tracking debts owed and favors given. 
Tracking reciprocal obligations with multiple individuals may place a compu-
tationally intensive burden on memory systems. 
Inhibitory Control 
Reciprocal interactions begin with an inhibitory problem: Can an individual 
inhibit the choice of the large benefit (the temptation to defect)? Animals often 
fail to inhibit their preferences for larger rewards. In the reversed-contingency 
task, subjects must reach toward the smaller of two visible rewards to receive 
the larger reward (Boysen and Berntson 1995). Numerous primate species 
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tested in this paradigm failed repeatedly to learn the contingency, because they 
could not inhibit their response to choose the larger of two options: the inhibi-
tory system appears to be too weak. Subjects can learn to solve this task, but 
the solution requires hundreds to thousands of trials, correction procedures, or 
symbolic representation of the quantities (Boysen et al. 1996; Silberberg and 
Fujita 1996; Murray et al. 2005). This strong preference for larger rewards 
suggests that choosing altruistic actions (those providing smaller benefits when 
a larger benefit is available) may also prove difficult. Therefore, strong inhibi-
tory control capacities are required to implement reciprocal strategies. 
Self-control 
Reciprocal altruism not only requires choosing a smaller benefit but also wait-
ing for the reciprocated benefit, thus, requiring self-control. In reality, however, 
animals behave quite impulsively. When given a choice between a smaller, im-
mediate reward and a larger, delayed reward, animals show a strong preference 
for immediacy (Mazur 1987). For instance, when offered a choice between an 
immediate option and a delayed option, marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jac-
chus) refuse to wait more than 20 seconds for three times as much food (Ste-
vens, Hallinan et al. 2005). Most other species tested so far show a similar 
lack of self-control, with the exception of the apes, which can wait for minutes 
instead of seconds (Rosati et al. 2007). This intense preference for immediacy 
suggests that animals cannot forego the instant benefits of defection in lieu of 
the delayed benefits from reciprocal cooperation. An operant experiment with 
blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) demonstrated that some subjects cooperated in 
a Prisoner's Dilemma more often when they played an opponent using TFT 
and their impulsivity was experimentally reduced than when playing a defect-
ing opponent or when impulsivity was not reduced (Stephens et al. 2002). Re-
ciprocal altruism requires patience. 
A simple heuristic like TFT may be easy for humans to implement, but it 
requires cognitive building blocks-such as high memory capacity, inhibitory 
control, and patience-beyond the abilities of many animal species. This per-
spective raises the question: Are cognitive building blocks constraints on the 
evolution of behavior or are they evolutionary adaptations tuned for specific 
decision contexts? For instance, researchers often refer to memory as a con-
straint, emphasizing memory capacities and loads. Psychologists have begun 
exploring the adaptive nature of memory, showing how memory processes 
may track the usefulness of information in the environment (Anderson and 
Schooler 1991 and Schooler, this volume). Yet, building blocks such as mem-
ory may be adaptive only in a specific context. It remains unclear under what 
conditions they constrain or facilitate higher-level decision making. 
The Evolutionary Biology of Decision Making 301 
Conclusion 
A truly integrative study of decision making must synthesize evolutionary and 
psychological approaches. Though the emerging fields of cognitive ecology 
and evolutionary psychology have begun this integration, much work remains. 
Considering the selective pressures on decisions refines which kinds of corre-
spondence and coherence criteria are feasible for decisions. Natural selection 
does not favor coherence to rational norms, but increases fitness relative to 
others in the population. Considering selection also emphasizes that natural 
selection is a process of optimization under constraints. Because a constrained 
optimization process cannot generate a universally optimal process, unbound-
edly optimal decision mechanisms cannot exist in nature. Therefore, studying 
decision making with an eye on evolution can aid in understanding the goals of 
decision and thereby explain (or dispel) notions of irrational choice. Despite the 
advantages of accounting for natural selection in decision making, an entirely 
evolutionary, outcome-based approach overlooks the limitations that cognitive 
abilities impose on decision processes; certain cognitive building blocks must 
exist to implement decision processes. Many decisions can be made with a set 
of simple building blocks, whereas some require more sophisticated cogni-
tive abilities. Thus, a complete understanding of decision making rests on the 
appropriate integration of ultimate goals and evolutionary pressures with the 
psychological mechanisms of choice. 
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